FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Under an arrangement with the former U.S.S.R., Belarus was an original member of the United Nations. It also is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS - a group of 12 former Soviet republics) and its customs union, the Belarusian and Russian Union State, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Non-Aligned Movement, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
Following the recognition of Belarus as an independent state in December 1991 by the European Community, EU-Belarus relations initially experienced a steady progression. The signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1995 signaled a commitment to political, economic, and trade cooperation. Significant assistance was provided to Belarus within the framework of the TACIS technical assistance program and also through various aid programs and loans. However, progress in EU-Belarus relations stalled in 1996 after serious setbacks in the development of democracy. The EU did not recognize the 1996 constitution that replaced the 1994 constitution. Neither the PCA nor its trade-related elements were implemented, and Belarus was not invited to join the EU's Neighborhood Policy. Belarusian membership in the Council of Europe was not supported, bilateral relations at the ministerial level were suspended, and EU technical assistance programs were frozen. In 1998, relations were further worsened when President Lukashenko evicted several western ambassadors from their homes in the Drozdy area of Minsk. In 2004, the Council of Europe adopted a report written by special rapporteur Christos Pourgourides calling on Belarusian authorities to suspend various high-level officials after conducting a thorough investigation of the cases of several prominent Belarusian political figures who have disappeared and remain unaccounted for. In line with the U.S., the EU spoke strongly against the government's conduct of the 2006 election, noting that additional restrictive measures would be imposed against those officials responsible for abuses. After the election, the U.S. and EU imposed travel restrictions and financial sanctions against those responsible for abuses. The EU also launched a two-year, two million Euro project to support Belarusian access to independent information, which complements U.S. assistance programs. In June 2007, the EU announced the withdrawal of GSP trade preferences for Belarus, following an assessment by the International Labor Organization that Belarus had not acted to ensure the protection of labor rights and freedom of association. After the September 2008 parliamentary elections, the EU issued a statement expressing its concern about the conduct of the elections, which despite some progress did not correspond to the OSCE’s democratic standards. In October 2008, the EU suspended its visa sanctions for six months on numerous Belarusian officials, including President Lukashenko, in response to Belarus’ release of political prisoners in August.
Acknowledging the lack of progress in relation to bilateral relations and the internal situation following the position adopted in 1997, the EU adopted a benchmark approach in 1999, whereby relations would be gradually improved upon fulfillment of the four benchmarks set by the OSCE. In 2000, some moderately positive developments toward the implementation of recommendations made by the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) were observed, but were not sufficient in the realm of access to fair and free elections. The Belarusian authorities, objecting to the OSCE AMG's activities, forced it to shutdown by failing to renew visas or extend accreditation of its professional staff. The Belarusian authorities agreed to a successor OSCE presence after 14 EU member countries and the U.S. imposed visa restrictions on the travel of high-ranking Belarusian officials. The OSCE Office in Minsk formally came into existence on January 1, 2003 with a mandate to "assist the Belarusian authorities in further promoting institution-building, in further consolidating the Rule of Law and in developing relations with civil society, in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments."
Russia is the largest partner for Belarus in the economic and political fields. In terms of trade, over one-third of Belarusian exports go to Russia. Due to the structure of Belarusian industry, Belarus relies heavily on other CIS countries and Russia in particular both for export markets and for the supply of raw materials, subsidized energy, and components. The 2007 steep increase in the price of natural gas and higher tariffs on Russian-sourced oil and oil products have contributed to a crisis in the Belarusian economy, forcing the regime to cut popular subsidies and to borrow from outside sources to finance the budget. Belarus received a $1.5 billion stabilization loan from Russia in late 2007, and has asked for another loan in 2008.
The framework for the Russia-Belarusian Union was set out in the Treaty on the
Formation of a Community of Russia and Belarus (1996), the Treaty on
Russia-Belarus Union, the Union Charter (1997), and the Treaty of the Formation
of a Union State (1999). The integration treaties contain commitments to
monetary union, equal rights, single citizenship, and a common foreign and
defense policy. They also have established a range of institutions modeled after
the EU. After protracted disputes and setbacks, the two countries' customs
duties were unified as of March 2001. Belarus has made progress in monetary
stabilization in the context of ongoing negotiation with the Russian Central
Bank on monetary union. However, Belarus has repeatedly pushed back the date for
implementing a monetary union. A dispute with Russia in late 2006 and early 2007
over gas prices and oil import duties raised further doubts about the future of
the union, and many of the provisions of the union have yet to be implemented.
Most recently, talks in October 2008 focused on plans to move forward with
unification of customs rates for the Union State, supposedly to be completed by
the end of the year, and the use of the Russian ruble for mutual payments. South
Ossetia and Abkhazia have both expressed interest in joining the Union State,
and in order for them to do so, their application must first be approved by the
Union Parliament, and then the presidents of Belarus and Russia must approve the
Parliament’s resolution to accept Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
U.S.-BELARUSIAN RELATIONS
The United States recognized Belarusian independence on December 25, 1991. After the two countries established diplomatic relations, the U.S. Embassy in Minsk was officially opened on January 31, 1992. Ambassador David H. Swartz, the first Ambassador to Belarus, officially assumed post on August 25, 1992, the first anniversary of Belarusian independence, and departed post on completion of his term in late January 1994. On November 7, 1994, Ambassador Kenneth S. Yalowitz assumed post. He was succeeded by Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard, who served from August 1997 to August 2000, spending one year recalled to Washington because of a dispute between the government and Western embassies over the confiscation of diplomatic residences. Michael G. Kozak served as U.S. Ambassador from October 2000 to August 2003. George A. Krol served as U.S. Ambassador from September 2003 to July 2006. Karen B. Stewart replaced Ambassador Krol as U.S. Ambassador and arrived in Belarus on September 18, 2006. She was recalled on March 12, 2008 following a threat of expulsion by the Belarusian authorities and the recall of Belarus’ Ambassador to the U.S. Belarus subsequently voluntarily reduced the staff at its U.S. missions, excluding the mission to the UN, to five persons and demanded the U.S. reciprocate by reducing the U.S. Embassy in Minsk to five diplomats. When the U.S. refused to comply, the Belarusian authorities expelled several U.S. diplomats to reduce U.S. Embassy staffing to five diplomats. The U.S. has imposed no restrictions on Belarus’ diplomatic missions to the U.S.
The two countries have exchanged top-level official visits. Stanislav Shushkevich, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, met with President Clinton in Washington in July 1992, and President Clinton visited Belarus on January 15, 1994. After this high point in relations, however, bilateral relations cooled following the election of President Alexander Lukashenko in July 1994.
On September 12, 1995 three hot air balloons participating in the Coupe Gordon Bennett race entered Belarusian air space. Despite the fact that race organizers informed the Belarusian Government about the race in May and that flight plans had been filed, the Belarusian air force shot down one balloon, killing two American citizens, and forced the other two to land. The crews of the other two balloons were fined for entering Belarus without a visa and released. Belarus to date has not apologized or offered compensation for these killings.
In November 1996, the Lukashenko regime conducted an internationally unrecognized constitutional referendum, which resulted in the dissolution of Belarus’ legitimate parliament and the centralization of power in the executive branch. In that same year, the Belarusian authorities provoked a diplomatic crisis by demanding and, in contravention of international law, eventually confiscating diplomatic residences in the Drozdy housing compound, including the U.S. Ambassador’s residence. This action led the United States and other countries to withdraw their ambassadors from Belarus until the Belarusian authorities provided compensation and guarantees to respect international law. In addition, Lukashenko used his newly centralized power to repress human rights throughout the country, including persecuting members of the illegally disbanded Belarusian parliament (13th Supreme Soviet) and former members of his own government.
As a result of these events and tendencies, in 1997, the United States announced its decision to pursue a "selective engagement" policy with the Government of Belarus. This policy included downgrading government-to-government contacts to the level of Assistant Secretary and below, and restricting U.S. Government assistance to the Belarusian Government--with the exception of humanitarian assistance and exchange programs with state-run educational institutions. At the same time, the U.S. greatly expanded contacts with Belarusian civil society to promote democratization in Belarus.
Since 1997, despite growing U.S. engagement with Belarusian society, official bilateral relations have remained at a low level. In 2003, the United States, in tandem with the European Union, proposed a step-by-step, gradual approach to improve bilateral relations: the United States would respond positively to genuine efforts by Belarusian authorities to improve Belarus' human rights and electoral practices. Belarusian authorities failed to take such steps to warrant a positive response.
In October 2004, the U.S. Congress passed, and the President signed, the Belarus
Democracy Act, which was designed to promote democratization. In signing the
act, President Bush noted that the authorities were turning Belarus into "a regime of repression in the heart of Europe," and set out the U.S. policy of working "with our allies and partners to assist those seeking to return Belarus to its rightful place among the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies." After a deeply flawed presidential election in March 2006, the U.S., acting with the EU, imposed travel restrictions and targeted financial sanctions against Belarusian officials implicated in human rights abuses and election fraud. The financial sanctions prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in financial transactions with named persons. On January 12, 2007, President Bush signed the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act, which repeated the call for targeted sanctions against Belarusian officials and continued assistance for democracy building activities. In August 2007, the U.S. widened application of travel restrictions on Belarusians to include directors and deputy directors of state enterprises. In November 2007, the Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets of Belarus' oil and chemical conglomerate, Belneftekhim, because of Alexander Lukashenko's control of the company. After the Belarusian authorities released the last of its political prisoners in August 2008, the U.S. suspended sanctions for six months on two Belneftekhim subsidiaries: Lakokraska and Polotsk Steklovolokno. The U.S. will assess the situation in Belarus at the end of this period and consider whether to extend the suspensions. To underscore U.S. support for the Belarusian people's democratic aspirations, the President and Secretary of State have frequently met with Belarusian pro-democracy activists, most recently during a December 2007 visit to Washington, DC of leaders of Belarusian pro-democracy political parties and NGO leaders.
U.S.-Belarusian Economic Relations
The U.S. Government continues to support the development of the private sector in Belarus and its transition to a free market economy. With the advent of the Lukashenko regime, Belarusian authorities have pursued a generally hostile policy toward the private sector and have refused to initiate the basic economic reforms necessary to create a market-based economy. Most of the Belarusian economy remains in government hands. The government, in particular the presidential administration, exercises control over most enterprises in all sectors of the economy. In addition to driving away many major foreign investors--largely through establishment of a "Golden Share" requirement, which allows government control in all companies with foreign investment--Belarus' centralization and command approach to the economy has left only a trickle of U.S. Government and international assistance programs in this field.
In February 1993, a bilateral trade treaty guaranteeing reciprocal most-favored-nation status entered into force. In January 1994, the U.S. and Belarus signed a bilateral investment treaty, which has been ratified by Belarus but has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. In addition, due to continuing repression of labor rights in Belarus, the U.S. removed Belarus from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 2000.
The United States has encouraged Belarus to conclude and adhere to agreements
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on macroeconomic stabilization and
related reform measures, as well as to undertake increased privatization and to
create a favorable climate for business and investment. Although there has been
some American direct private investment in Belarus, its development has been
relatively slow. An Overseas Private Investment Corporation agreement was signed
in June 1992 but has been suspended since 1995 because Belarus did not fulfill
its obligations under the agreement. Belarus is eligible for Export-Import Bank
short-term financing insurance for U.S. investments, but because of the adverse
business climate, no projects have been initiated. The IMF granted standby
credit in September 1995, but Belarus fell off the program and did not receive
the second tranche of funding, which had been scheduled for regular intervals
throughout 1996. Since that time, Belarus has had an ongoing discussion to
relaunch IMF-backed reforms, concluding an IMF Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) in
2001, which ended in September 2001 with relatively disappointing results. In
early 2004, Belarus halted negotiations on a follow-on stand-by arrangement due
to disagreements with the IMF on macroeconomic policy and claiming that it did
not require IMF funding.
Because of the unpredictable and at times hostile environment for investors, the U.S. Government currently does not encourage U.S. companies to invest in Belarus. Belarus’ continuing problems with an opaque, arbitrary legal system, a confiscatory tax regime, cumbersome licensing system, price controls, and lack of an independent judiciary create a business environment not conducive to prosperous, profitable investment. In fact, several U.S. investors in Belarus have left, including the Ford Motor Company.
U.S. Assistance to Belarus
U.S. Government assistance programs in Belarus support and encourage civil society development, access to independent information, pro-democracy forces, and the emergence of democracy in a very difficult and challenging environment. Most assistance is in the form of training and exchanges, as well as small grants and capacity-building for local non-governmental organizations. The U.S. also supports external radio and television broadcasting into Belarus, and external websites. Because the Belarusian authorities have not embraced market reforms, the U.S. is able to program only modest activities in support of private entrepreneurs. The U.S. provides some health program funding and supports international organizations' efforts in Belarus to combat the growing problem of trafficking in persons. With very limited exceptions, including humanitarian assistance and exchange programs involving state-run educational institutions, bilateral assistance is not channeled through the Government of Belarus.
For FY 2007, the U.S. provided $11.34 million to Belarus. Assistance is provided
to Belarus under the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and
Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act (FSA) enacted in October 1992. U.S.
Government assistance to Belarus peaked in 1994 at a level of approximately $76
million (consisting of more than $16 million in FREEDOM Support Act funds and
some $60 million in funds from various U.S. Government agencies). However, U.S.
assistance levels dropped sharply due to the lack of progress in democratic and
economic reforms after Alexander Lukashenko came to power in mid-1994.
Belarus was previously a recipient of assistance under the U.S. Defense
Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, whose objective is to
reduce the threat posed to the United States by weapons of mass destruction
remaining on the territory of the former Soviet Union by promoting
denuclearization and demilitarization and preventing weapons proliferation.
However, in February 1997, due to the Belarusian authorities’ poor record on human rights, President Clinton de-certified Belarus, thus rendering the country ineligible for further CTR assistance and placing restrictions on other security-related assistance as well. The United States and Belarus signed a government-to-government umbrella agreement on CTR assistance in 1992, seven agency-to-agency CTR implementing agreements, and one memorandum of understanding and cooperation. The umbrella agreement was extended for one year in October 1997 but has now expired.
For more detailed information on U.S. Government assistance to Belarus, please see the annual reports to Congress on U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, which are available in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs section on the State Department's website. A fact sheet on U.S. Assistance to Belarus can be found at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/49300.htm. Information is also available on USAID's website at the address: http://www.usaid.gov.
DEFENSE AND MILITARY ISSUES
The United States continues to support Belarus' adherence to arms control agreements and treaties into which it has previously entered, including the Open Skies Treaty which Belarus ratified in 2001. Cooperation in all such agreements has been exemplary.
Humanitarian aid continues to be the primary engagement between the U.S.
military and Belarus. Humanitarian assistance programs have provided a tangible,
long-lasting service and have encouraged goodwill toward the U.S. Government and
the U.S. military. Renovation of the Gomel Emergency Treatment Hospital was
recently concluded. The hospital received more than $600,000 in humanitarian
assistance, which included funds for general renovation and the establishment of
its blood transfusion center. The humanitarian aid program has two principal
elements. The Humanitarian Assistance Program-Excess Property donates non-lethal
goods and technical assistance for humanitarian purposes. Other assistance
focuses on projects such as the refurbishment of medical facilities and the
construction of school buildings.
Direct military to military cooperation continues to be minimal. Belarus currently has no International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and bilateral exercises and cooperation are nonexistent. There is a great desire on the Belarusian side to re-establish such cooperation and contacts, but it has not been possible due to the political situation. The only program that is still functional within this category is the attendance of Belarusian military officers in George C. Marshall Center programs.
Belarus is currently cooperating with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through the Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, to destroy a total of 700,000 conventional landmines. Belarus also has a stockpile of over 3 million non-conventional anti-personnel mines, which it has pledged to destroy by March 2008. In addition, there are numerous World War II-vintage minefields, which are still in place and kill or injure several Belarusians every year.
The Ministry of Defense is experiencing success in the area of military reform. Planned changes include combining the Air and Air Defense Forces, downsizing the force structure about 30% from 83,000 to 60,000, transitioning from a conscript to a contract force, and modernizing the command and control structure by creating a Ground Forces Command between the Ministry of Defense and the units in the field. Implementation of these reforms will take an unspecified amount of time.
There have been numerous reports of Belarusian sales or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies to states of concern, including state sponsors of terrorism. In April and September 2004, the United States imposed sanctions on a Belarusian entity, Belvneshpromservice, pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 for the transfer to Iran of items on a multilateral export control list or items having the potential of making a material contribution to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems.
Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Karen Brevard Stewart
Deputy Chief of Mission--Jonathan Moore
Political/Economic Officer--Louis Crishock
Consular Officer--Sara Michael
Management Officer--Kirby Nelson
Regional Security Officer--Christine Putz
Public Affairs Officer--William James
Defense Attaché--Lt Colonel Keith Detwiler
Information Program Officer--Mark Hall
USAID--Chuck Howell
The U.S. Embassy in Minsk, Belarus is located at Starovilenskaya 46; tel: (375-17) 210-12-83; fax: (375-17) 234-78-53.
